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1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been envisioned to be very useful for a broad spectrum
of emerging civil and military applications (Akyildiz et al., 2002). However, sensor networks
are also confronted with many security threats such as node compromise, routing disruption
and false data injection, because they are normally operated in an unattended, harsh or hos-
tile environment. Among all these threats, the WSNs are particularly vulnerable to the node
compromise because sensor nodes are not tamper-proof devices. When a sensor network is
deployed in unattended and hostile environments such as battlefield, the adversaries may
capture and reprogram some sensor nodes, or inject some malicious sensor nodes into the
network and make the network accept them as legitimate nodes. After getting control of a
few nodes, the adversary can mount various attacks from inside the network (Zhang et al.,
2008). Therefore, it is desirable to design key distribution protocols to support secure and
robust pair-wise communication among any pair of sensors.
This is a challenging task in sensor networks because they have scarce resources in energy,
computation and communication. As a result, the conventional asymmetric key cryptosys-
tem, such as RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) and Diffie-Hellman (Diffie & Hellman, 1976), can not
be implemented in sensor nodes due to their very limited capacities and only lightweight
energy efficient key distribution mechanisms are affordable. Furthermore, sensor nodes are
low-cost and they cannot afford tamper-resistance hardware. Recent advances in physical at-
tack show that even memory chips with built-in tamper-resistance mechanisms are subject
to various memory read-out attacks. Thus, an adversary might easily capture the sensor de-
vices to acquire their sensitive data and keys and then abuse them to further compromise the
communication between other non-captured nodes. In order to conquer such node capture at-
tack (NCA) problem, it is desirable to design protocols to support secure and robust pair-wise
communication among any pair of sensors.
To defend against such attack, the security mechanisms in WSNs are required. Most of exist-
ing key management schemes focus on the efficiency of bootstrapping session keys which has
been intensively studied in the literature of WSNs (Cheng & Agrawal, 2005; Du et al., 2003;
Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002). Traditionally, once such key system is adopted, the whole secu-
rity system is established and fixed. However, when the WSN runs for a long time using a
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fixed key, it enhances the probability for the adversaries to decrypt the key by analyzing the
adequate messages eavesdropped or capturing some nodes. Under this circumstance, the en-
tire network security might be threatened. Thus, it is necessary to update this key with a new
key periodically to maintain backward secrecy (Mishra, 2002). The idea is to prevent a node
with the new key from going backwards in time to decipher previous content encrypted with
prior keys. Likewise, when a node leaves, it is necessary to update the key to maintain for-
ward secrecy (Mishra, 2002). The idea is to prevent a node from using an old key to continue
to decrypt new content.
WSNs can be broadly classified into flat WSNs and hierarchical WSNs. It has been shown in
(Cheng & Agrawal, 2007) that a hierarchical architecture can provide better performance, in
terms of communication overhead, than a flat architecture in such networks. This is the mar-
jor reason why most recent lightweight energy efficient rekeying mechanisms are proposed
for hierarchical WSNs. In a flat WSN, all senor nodes have the same computational and com-
munication capacities. In a hierarchical WSN, however, some special sensor devices, called
Cluster Head (CH), have much higher capacities than other sensor nodes. By applying some
clustering algorithms like (Heinzelman et al., 2002), the whole set of sensor devices could be
partitioned into several distinct clusters such that each cluster has at least one CH. Under this
arrangement, each sensor node forwards the generated packets to its local CH by short-range
transmissions, and the CH then performs a pre-processing for the raw data received from all
other senor nodes in the cluster and finally forwards the aggregated data to the sink node, or
Base Station (BS), by long-range transmissions.
Most existing polynomial-based rekeying schemes suffer the node capture attack. Let us ex-
amine Chadha’s rekeying protocol proposed in (Chadha et al., 2005) as an example to show
its vulnerability to NCA. The basic idea is that the rekeying message from a CH can disal-
low the compromised nodes to renew their pair-wise keys. In the pre-loading phase, each
sensor node Si is pre-loaded the secret values h(Si) obtained from a 2t-degree masking poly-
nomial h(x). This scheme assumes that each CH has the intrusion detection capacity. In the
rekeying phase, the CH generates a t-degree secrecy polynomial f (x) and constructs w(x) as
w(x) = g(x) f (x) + h(x), where g(x) is constructed using the Ids of all compromised nodes.
Once g(x) is evaluated at the Id of any malicious node, the result will be equal to 0. The CH
then broadcasts w(x) and the Id list of all detected compromised nodes throughout the whole
group members. Upon receiving the message, any non-revoked node Si can compute the new
pair-wise key f (Si) between sensor node Si as follows: f (Si) = (w(Si) − h(Si))/g(Si). We
observe that if there are (2t + 1) nodes are compromised in an arbitrary rekeying phase, the
2t-degree polynomial h(x) can be derived. Recalling that the polynomials w(x) and g(x) are
public, we conclude that f (x) can be derived as well and used to calculate the pair-wise key in
any given rekeying phase. In addition, their vulnerability to the node capture attack disables
them from supporting both forward and backward secrecy. This motivates us to design a new
compromise-resilient pair-wise rekeying scheme with strong resistance to such attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our system model and gives
an overview of background knowledge. Section 3 describes a perturbation based pair-wise
rekeying protocol. Sections 4 and 5 evaluate the security and the performance of our proposal,
respectively. Section 6 summarizes our findings.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Network Model
As in other hierarchical models of sensor network (Cheng & Agrawal, 2007; Zhang et al.,
2005), our system also assumes that a sensor network is divided into clusters, which are the
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minimum unit for detecting events. A cluster head coordinates all the actions inside a clus-
ter and each pair of cluster heads in their transmission range can communicate directly with
each other. Each low-cost sensor node (SN) has low data processing capability, limited mem-
ory storage and battery power supplies, and short radio transmission range. The CHs are
equipped with richer resources (e.g., higher power batteries, large memory storages, powerful
antenna, etc.) and higher data processing capacities, and thus can execute relatively compli-
cated numerical operations. Moreover, we assume a single base station (BS) or an access point
(AP) in the network and works as the network controller to collect event data. The information
collected by cluster heads from all its sensor nodes is retrieved by a BS or a AP periodically.
During the information retrieval operation, the BS/AP broadcasts a beacon to activate clus-
ter heads in its coverage area. Activated cluster heads then transmit their data to the BS/AP
through a common wireless channel. As the most powerful node in a WSN, the BS/AP has
virtually unlimited memory storage capacity and sufficiently large radio transmission range
to reach all other devices in a network.
Under such model, we say the link (v, u), corresponding to the wireless communication chan-
nel between nodes v and u, is secure if they share a secret pairwise key Kv,u. Due to the con-
strained resources, computationally expensive and energy-intensive operations for pairwise
key establishment are not favorable for such systems. In addition, each sensor node is not
tamper-resistant. Once a sensor node is captured, the adversary can read its memory to get
all information stored there. Schemes for key predistribution enable nodes in a large network
to agree on pairwise secret keys. The sensor network is administrated by an offline authority,
which is responsible for node initialization and deployment. Before deploying a node, the
authority assigns the node a unique identity (ID) from a set of legitimate IDs and some secret
information that will be used to allow any two nodes v and u to agree on a shared key Kv,u.
2.2 Symmetric Polynomial Function
As the basis of our pair-wise rekeying protocol for any wireless link between a CH and a SN,
the polynomial-based key predistribution scheme originally proposed in (Blundo et al., 1993)
works as follows.
Let Fq be a finite field, in which q is the maximum prime number satisfying q < 2
ℓ that can
accommodate a cryptographic key with ℓ bits. The elements of Fq can be used as pairwise
keys. To achieve t-resilience using the Blundo’s scheme (Blundo et al., 1993), the authority
chooses a random symmetric bivariate polynomial f ∈ Fq[x, y] of degree t in each variable as
the master secret polynomial:









The coefficients aij (aij = aji) are randomly chosen from Fq. A node with Id u ∈ Fq is preloaded
the univariate polynomial:
gu(y) = f (u, y). (2)
The shared key Kv,u between nodes v and u is
gv(u) = f (v, u) = gu(v), (3)
which both parties can compute using the fact that f (x, y) is symmetric. The security proof
in (Blundo et al., 1993) ensures that this scheme is unconditionally secure and t-collusion re-
sistant; i.e., a coalition of no more than t compromised nodes cannot know anything about
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the key shared by any two non-compromised nodes. However, an attacker who compromises
t + 1 nodes can use interpolation to recover the master polynomial f (x, y).
By applying the symmetric property, a secure link can be easily built up by just exchanging
the IDs of transmission nodes. On the other hand, a t-degree bivariate polynomial key scheme
can only keep secure against coalitions of up to t compromised sensors. Although increasing
the value of t can improve the security property of bivariate polynomial key scheme, it is not
suitable for wireless sensor networks due to the limited memory size of sensors.
2.3 Perturbation Polynomial Function
Our proposed pair-wise rekeying protocol exploits the characteristic of the perturbation poly-
nomial, which was originally introduced in (Zhang et al., 2007). Given a finite field Fq, a
positive integer r (r < ℓ), and a set of node Ids S (S ⊂ {0, · · · , q − 1}), a polynomial set Φ
is a set of perturbation polynomials regarding r and S if any polynomial φ(·) ∈ Φ has the
following limited infection property:
∀x ∈ S, φ(x) ∈ {0, · · · , 2r − 1} . (4)
According to the above definition, the value of a perturbation polynomial will not be larger
than (2r − 1), i.e., it has at most r bits. This property is used to design perturbation-based
scheme. If let an r-bit number add to a ℓ-bit number, only the least significant r-bit of the ℓ-bit
numer will be directly affected. Wheather the most significant (ℓ− r) bits are changed or not
will hinge on if a carry is generated from the least significant r bits in the addition process. For
example, we assume ℓ = 6 and r = 4. The addition (101001)2 + (0101)2 = (101110)2 changes
the least significant 4-bits but not the most ℓ− r = 2 significant bits of the first operand, but
(101001)2 + (1100)2 = (110101)2 not only changes least significant 4-bits but also the most
significant 2 bits, because a carry is generated from the least significant 4-bits.
3. A Pair-wise Rekeying Protocol
In general, the design of a light-weight compromise-recilient rekeying scheme in WSNs is
difficult because of the vulnerability of sensor nodes and the constrained system resources.
Due to these challenges, a practical pair-wise rekeying scheme for WSNs should be resilient to
large number of node compromises, be efficient in computation, communication, and storage,
and allow both full and direct key establishment. In this section, we present a perturbation-
based pair-wise rekeying protocol that can achieve all these goals.
In the basic polynomial-based scheme (Blundo et al., 1993), where any two nodes (with IDs
u and v) are given shares ( f (u, y) and f (v, y)) of a symmetric polynomial f (x, y), they can
always find a match f (u, v) to be used as the shared key of size ℓ bits. Different from this, our
rekeying scheme does not use shares generated from symmetric polynomial but perturbation
polynomials such that (1) a match can still be achived and (2) the shared key is difficult to
crack by large-scale NCAs. To further explain the above basic idea, we now introduce the
three major steps of the rekeying scheme: system initialization, pre-distribution of perturbed
polynomials, and key establishment and rekeying. In order to present it in a formal way, we
list the notations used in our protocol descriptions in Table 1 for convenience to the readers.
3.1 System Initialization
We assume that there are n sensor nodes to be deployed in the network. The node deployment
can be done by only once, or several times in order to extend the lifetime of the network with
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Notation Description
CHa The Id of cluster head a
CSk The Id of compromised sensor node k
E(data, K) An encryption function using K as a key
f (x, y) a symmetric polynomial
Fq a finite field with any element that can be represented by ℓ bits
gu(y) the univariate polynomial for node u obtained by gu(y) = f (u, y)
ḡu(y) the perturbed polynomial preloaded to node u
Hk(x) the hashed value based on the most significant k bits of x
Ka,b the shared pairwise key between nodes a and b
ℓ the minimal integer satisfying 2ℓ > q
n the total number of sensor nodes to be deployed, n < q
na the number of sensor nodes in a cluster
nc the number of compromised sensor nodes in a cluster
m the total number of perturbation polynamials, m = |Φ|
pu(y) a randomly generated univariate rekeying polynomial at node u
q a large prime number
r a positive integer such that 2r < q
S a set of legitimate IDs for sensor nodes, S ⊂ {0, · · · , q − 1}
SNi The Id of sensor node i
t the degree of both variables x and y in the symmetric polynomial f (x, y)
φu(y) a perturbation polynamial assigned for node u
Φ a set of perturbation polynamials satisfying the limited infection property
regarding r and S
Table 1. Notations
the renewed nodes. Based on the number n, a large prime number q is chosen such that n < q
and let ℓ be the minimal integer satisfying 2ℓ > q.
The offline authority arbituary constructs a bivariate symmetric polynomial f (x, y) ∈ Fq[x, y],
where the degrees of x and y are both t, and for any x, y ∈ Fq, f (x, y) = f (y, x). It then applies
the method in (Zhang et al., 2007) to construct the legitimate ID set S for sensor nodes and
the perturbation polynamial set Φ, which satisfies the limited infection property regarding r
and S with m (m ≥ 2) number of bivariate symmetric polynomials. Finally, we note that the
desired number of bits for any pairwise key is ℓ− r.
3.2 Pre-distribution of Perturbed Polynomials
Before sensor devices are deployed into usage, some secret information should be pre-
assigned as follows. Each cluster head a needs to be preloaded with a unique Id CHa ∈ S
and a perturbed polynomial gCHa (y):
gCHa (y) = f (CHa, y) + φCHa (y) = gCHa (y) + φCHa (y). (5)
Similarly, for each sensor node i, the security server preloads it with a unique Id SNi ∈ S and
a perturbed polynomial gSNi (y):
gSNi (y) = f (SNi, y) + φSNi (y) = gSNi (y) + φSNi (y). (6)
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Fig. 1. The protocol for pair-wise key establishment and rekeying
Note that the security authority only preloads each sensor device u (a CH or SN) the coeffi-
cients of gu(y). Hence, each sensor device cannot extract from gu(y) the coefficients of the
original polynomial shares of either f (x, y), fu(y), or φu(y) (φu(·) ∈ Φ). Furthermore, each
sensor device is equipped with the same one-way hash function Hk(x), which returns the
hashed value based on the most significant k bits of x.
3.3 Pair-wise Key Establishment and Rekeying
After the key pre-assignment phase, wireless sensors are randomly distributed in a given
area, and later on, some clustering algorithm, e.g., (Heinzelman et al., 2002), shall organize
the network into a hierarchical structure. The following intra-cluster protocol, as illustrated
in Figure 1, is to establish the new pair-wise key between a cluster head a and one of its
member sensor nodes i in a new round of rekeying phase, in which the orignal pair-wise
key establishment is treated the same as the subsequent rekeyings. The inter-cluster rekeying
protocol for CH-CH links works in a similar manner and thus is omitted here.
• Step 1: At the beginning of each rekeying phase, CHa randomly generates a new t-
degree univariate rekeying polynomial function pCHa (y). For each of its sensor node
SNi, CHa updates the corresponding pair-wise key KCHa ,SNi as
KCHa ,SNi = H
ℓ−r(pCHa (SNi)). (7)
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• Step 2: CHa uses pCHa (y) and the preloaded polynomial gCHa (y) to construct a master
polynomial wCHa (y):
wCHa (y) = pCHa (y) + gCHa (y) (8)
and broadcasts its ID CHa and this polynomial wCHa (y) to all its sensor nodes by a
single transmission.
• Step 3: Upon receiving the broadcast message, each SNi evaluates the preloaded poly-
nomial gSNi (y) at y = CHa and evaluates the receieved master polynomial wCHa (y)
at y = SNi. After that, three candidate keys K
∗
CHa ,SNi




calculated as follows, respectively.
K∗CHa ,SNi = H
ℓ−r
(
wCHa (SNi)− gSNi (CHa)
)
(9)
K+CHa ,SNi = H
ℓ−r
(




K−CHa ,SNi = H
ℓ−r
(




• Step 4: At a later time, a encoded information E(msg, KCHa ,SNi ) will be piggybacked
in a normal unicast message sent from CHa to SNi. The exact new pair-wise key is
determined by SNi once such message can be decoded successfully using one of the
candidate keys.
Note that due to the characteristic of the perturbation polynomial (Zhang et al., 2007), only










The unicast message can be also sent from SNi to CHa. Under this circumstance, the new
pair-wise key will be calculated at SNi as KCHa ,SNi = H
ℓ−r
(
wCHa (SNi)− gSNi (CHa)
)
, while
three candidate keys will be evaluated at CHa as K
∗
CHa ,SNi




Hℓ−r (pCHa (SNi) + 2
r), and K−CHa ,SNi = H
ℓ−r (pCHa (SNi)− 2
r). All remaining rekeying pro-
cesses are the same and conclusion in (12) will be also made.
3.4 Examples
To help understand the details of our rekeying protocol, we provide the following simplified
example with CHa = 3 and SNi = 2. In system initialization, we set q = 127, t = 2, ℓ = 7, and
r = 3. All arithmetic operations are over finite field F127. The bivariate symmetric polynomial
is f (x, y) = xy2 + x2y + 2xy + 5 and the corresponding univariate polynomials for CHa and
SNi are g3(y) = f (3, y) = 3y
2 + 15y+ 5 and g2(y) = f (2, y) = 2y
2 + 8y+ 5, respectively. Now,
we consider the following cases in a rekeying phase, in which CHa generates a new univariate
polynomial function p3(y) = 3y
2 + 15y+ 9 under different preloaded perturbed polynomials.
Case 1: Suppose the perturbation polynomials for CHa and SNi are φ3(y) = y
2 − 3y + 5
and φ2(y) = y
2 − 4y + 5, respectively. Note that both polynomials satisfy the limited
infection property: φ3(2) = 3 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 7} and φ2(3) = 2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 7}. Their
preloaded polynomials are therefore g3(y) = g3(y) + φ3(y) = 4y
2 + 12y + 10 and
g2(y) = g2(y) + φ2(y) = 3y
2 + 4y + 10, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 2. In rekeying,
CHa calculates the new pair-wise key as K3,2 = H
4(p3(2)) = H
4(51) = H4(0110011) and
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                     














   
 
   






   
 
   












Fig. 2. Example of KCHa ,SNi = K
∗
CHa ,SNi
sends the master polynomials w3(y) = p3(y) + g3(y) = 7y
2 + 27y + 19 to SNi. At SNi side,
it then calculates three candidate keys: K∗3,2 = H
4(w3(2)− g2(3)) = H
4(52) = H4(0110100),
K+3,2 = H
4(60) = H4(0111100), and K−3,2 = H
4(44) = H4(0101100). We observe that
KCHa ,SNi = K
∗
CHa ,SNi
(H4(0110011) = H4(0110100)) is achieved.

                     














   
 
   






   
 
   












Fig. 3. Example of KCHa ,SNi = K
+
CHa ,SNi
Case 2: Under different perturbation polynomials φ3(y) = y
2 − 2y + 1 (φ3(2) = 1) for CHa
and φ2(y) = y
2 − y (φ2(3) = 6) for SNi, we can obtain g3(y) = g3(y) + φ3(y) = 4y
2 + 13y + 6,
g2(y) = g2(y) + φ2(y) = 3y
2 + 7y + 5, and w3(y) = p3(y) + g3(y) = 7y
2 + 28y + 15.
Eventually, we observe KCHa ,SNi = K
+
CHa ,SNi
(H4(0110011) = H4(0110110)) as shown in
Figure 3.
Case 3: Similarly, the perturbation polynomials φ3(y) = y
2 − 6y + 14 (φ3(2) = 6) and φ2(y) =
y2 − 7y + 13 (φ2(3) = 1) are for CHa and SNi, respectively. We then obtain g3(y) = g3(y) +
φ3(y) = 4y
2 + 9y + 19, g2(y) = g2(y) + φ2(y) = 3y
2 + y + 18, and w3(y) = p3(y) + g3(y) =

                    














   
 
   






   
 
   

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
                     














   
 
   






   
 
   













                     














   
 
   






   
 
   













                    














   
 
   






   
 
   












Fig. 4. Example of KCHa ,SNi = K
−
CHa ,SNi
7y2 + 24y + 28. The final case KCHa ,SNi = K
−
CHa ,SNi
(H4(0110011) = H4(0110000)) is shown in
Figure 4.
4. Security Analysis
In this section, we give a security analysis for our proposed rekeying scheme and compare it
to other proposals in terms of robustness to the node capture attack.
4.1 Breaking Rekeying Polynomial pCHa (y)
We assume that an adversary has compromised nc sensor nodes in cluster a, denoted as CSk
(k = 1, · · · , nc > t), and has obtained all their preloaded information.
To derive the polynomial pCHa (y) that is used to generate the new pair-wise key as shown in
(7), the adversary needs to break gCHa (y) because pCHa (y) = wCHa (y) − gCHa (y), in which
wCHa (y) is the public information broadcasted by CHa. Furthermore, for any sensor node y of
CHa, the corresponding pair-wise key KCHa ,y satisfies:
KCHa ,y = H
ℓ−r
(
wCHa (y)− gCHa (y)
)
= Hℓ−r (wCHa (y)− gCHa (y)− φCHa (y))
=
{
Hℓ−r (wCHa (y)− gCHa (y)) , or
Hℓ−r (wCHa (y)− gCHa (y)− 2
r) .
The above equation shows that to break gCHa (y) is equivalent to break gCHa (y) or f (CHa, y).
This can be done by collecting a number of polynomials gCSk (y) stored in the compromised
sensor nodes, which satisfy
gCSk (y) = f (CSk, y) + φCSk (y). (13)





i + bkj = dkj, 0 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc (14)
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Note that aij and bkj are the variables of this linear equation system, which are defined by (1)






j, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc, (15)






j, 1 ≤ k ≤ nc. (16)
By applying a similar reasoning technique in (Zhang et al., 2007), we can derive that the prob-
abilities to find the solution of the linear equation system (14) in one attempt is m−(t+1), in
which m is the total number of perturbation polynamials, i.e., m = |Φ| ≥ 2. In other words, to
break f (x, y), or gCHa (y) = f (CHa, y), in one attempt is m
−(t+1). Finally, we can conclude that






4.2 Node Capture Attack
After deployment, each cluster head and each sensor node can be captured and compro-
mised by attackers due to the unattended deployment environments and their lack of tamper-
resistance. The adversary can read out all information stored in the node to get all secret
information. In addition, the attackers may collect the secrets owned by compromised nodes,
and attempt to derive the secrets held by innocent nodes (and therefore can cheat these inno-
cent nodes or impersonate as them). This is the well-known node capture attack.
In the Chadha’s scheme (Chadha et al., 2005), each sensor node SNi is pre-loaded a 2t-degree
masking polynomial h(x) in its storage. After 2t sensor nodes are compromised, the whole
network will crash. In our proposed pair-wise rekeying protocol, in order to derive the rekey-
ing polynomial pCHa (y) of cluster head a, the adversary needs to break the original symmetric
polynomial f (x, y) with extremely low probability.
Assume that the degree of polynomial function is t = 80, the NCA-robustness comparison of
these two protocols are illustrated in Figure 5. As we observe that after a number of sensor
nodes are compromised, Chadha’s schemes will disclose the polynomials that can generate
any group key in the past or future. On the contrary, our proposed scheme can achieve both
forward and backward secrecy because such polynomials are extremely hard to be broken in
our approach.
5. Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposal by comparing with Chadha’s
scheme (Chadha et al., 2005). The performance metrics include the computational complexity,
communication overhead, and storage overhead. Table 2 summarizes the performance results.
In the Chadha’s scheme, each cluster head first constructs w(x) = g(x) f (x) + h(x) and
calculates na − nc pair-wise keys for all innocent nodes, in which na and nc are number
of all sensor nodes and compromised sensor nodes, respectively, in a cluster. It needs
O(n2c + nct + (na − nc)t) = O(n
2
c + nat) multiplications. Upon receiving w(x), each sensor















































































Fig. 5. NCA robustness comparison (t = 80)
Chadha’s Our Scheme
Computation
Cluster head O(n2c + nat) mul.
O((na − nc)ṫ) mul.
na − nc hash fun.




Cluster head (2t + nc + 1) · ℓ (t + 1) · ℓ
Sensor node 0 0
Storage
Cluster head (2t + 1) · ℓ (t + 1) · ℓ
Sensor node ℓ (t + 1) · ℓ
Table 2. Performance analysis
rekeying scheme, each cluster head needs to recalculate na −nc pair-wise keys using the rekey-
ing polynomial with O((na − nc)t) multiplications. Each key generation involves a hash func-
tion operation as well. For each sensor node, it needs to calculate three candidate keys, which
takes O(t) multiplications and 3 hash function operations.
In the Chadha’s scheme, each cluster head broadcasts a new 2t-degree polynomial w(x) and
nc Ids of detected compromised nodes to all the sensor nodes in the cluster. Such broadcast
message has (2t + nc + 1) · ℓ bits. No message transmission at sensoe node side. The only
communication overhead in our proposed scheme is the broadcast message for sending the
t-degree master polynomial with (t + 1) · ℓ bits. Note that, the overhead of the piggybacked
short message for key agreement are considered as normal traffic and not included in Table 2.
In the evaluation of storage overhead, we consider the space requirement of the preloaded
information in each sensor node and cluster head for the rekeying schemes. In Chadha’s
scheme, each cluster head is pro-loaded a 2t-degree masking polynomial function h(x). All
coefficients for the polynomial require (2t + 1) · ℓ bits. Each sensor node Si needs to store
one secret values h(Si) with ℓ bits. In our scheme, each sensor device (both cluster head and
sensor node) is preloaded one t-degree perturbed polynomial taking (t + 1) · ℓ bits.
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6. Conclusion
The traditional polynomial based pair-wise rekeying protocol suffers the large-scale node cap-
ture attack. Once t + 1 nodes are compromised, all previous and future keys for any pair of
nodes will be disclosed. We present a compromise-resilient pair-wise rekeying scheme based
on a three-tier WSN. It can significantly improve the security level by reducing this probabil-
ity from 1 down to m−(t+1) (m ≥ 2). Our proposed scheme also achieves both forward and
backward secrecy.
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